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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Rolf Larsen, former Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 against 
a large number of Pennsylvania entities and individuals. In 
the portions of the amended complaint at issue in the 
appeals before us, he asserted various constitutional claims 
against the Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
and individual Pennsylvania state Senators for their role in 
his impeachment and removal from office. Defendants filed 
a variety of motions in the district court challenging 
Larsen's right to maintain this action. Currently before us 
are consolidated appeals filed by individual Senators who 
challenge the district court's rulings rejecting the claims of 
nonjusticiability, absolute legislative immunity and 
qualified immunity arising out of Larsen's failure to 
demonstrate any property interest in his position as 
Justice. A related appeal in number 97-7153, which was 
filed by the individual Justices of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania and employees of the Administrative Office of 
the Pennsylvania Courts and which concerns the 
termination of Larsen's medical benefits, was argued before 
the same panel of this court, and is the subject of a 
separate opinion. 
 
I. 
 
Background 
 
Larsen was first elected to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania in 1977 for a ten-year term beginning 
January 1978, and was reelected for a second ten years as 
of 1988. In that year, the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry 
Review Board ("JIRB") charged him with several violations 
of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In 1991, the JIRB issued 
a report to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in which the 
Board found that Larsen, while acting without improper 
motive, had created an appearance of impropriety by 
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engaging in ex parte meetings with a trial judge presiding 
over cases in the Court of Common Pleas. The report 
recommended that Larsen be publicly reprimanded. On 
October 14, 1992, the Supreme Court (by Justices Zappala 
and Cappy with Justice Papadakos dissenting and voting 
for remand to the JIRB) issued a per curiam order, without 
opinion, adopting the JIRB's recommendation. See In re 
Larsen, 616 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1992). 
 
On November 24, 1992, Larsen filed a petition for the 
recusal and disqualification of Justices Zappala and Cappy. 
The petition alleged that those Justices had not been 
impartial and had improper motives throughout the 
investigation of Larsen and in deciding to adopt the JIRB's 
report and recommendation. Larsen also accused then- 
Chief Justice Nix of having improperly interfered with a 
pending trial in Lehigh County and with the petition for 
allowance to file an appeal in that case. 
 
In response to Larsen's petition, Pennsylvania Attorney 
General Preate appointed two special counsels to 
investigate Larsen's accusations. After almost a year of 
grand jury hearings, the grand jury found no credible 
evidence to support Larsen's allegations. It did, however, 
identify two areas of alleged misconduct by Larsen. They 
were that, over the previous ten years, Larsen had 
maintained a list of petitions for allowance of appeal to be 
given special treatment and had regularly obtained 
prescription drugs for his own use by causing doctors to 
issue prescriptions in the names of his staff members. On 
October 22, 1993, the grand jury recommended that 
criminal charges be filed against Larsen for the latter. 
Several days later, on October 28, 1993, Larsen was 
formally charged with violating and conspiring to violate the 
Controlled Substances Act, 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 780-101, et 
seq. That same day, the Supreme Court relieved Larsen of 
all responsibilities as a Justice, though he continued to 
receive his salary. 
 
On April 9, 1994, after a five-day trial in the Court of 
Common Pleas, Larsen was convicted by a jury of two 
counts of conspiring to violate the Controlled Substances 
Act. On May 24, the Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives, which had been investigating Larsen for 
 
                                5 
  
months, adopted seven Articles of Impeachment against 
him. They included (I) according special treatment to 
certain petitions for allowance of appeal in cases where his 
friends were counsel of record who had made political 
contributions to him, (II) having ex parte communications 
with one such counsel and voting consistent with that 
counsel's position, (III) lying before the grand jury that was 
investigating him, (IV) communicating with a trial judge 
regarding a case pending before her and providing extra- 
record information beneficial to a party represented by one 
of Larsen's friends, (V) making allegations in bad faith 
against Justices Zappala and Cappy, (VI) obtaining 
prescription drugs for his own use in the names of his staff 
members, and (VII) undermining confidence in the judiciary 
and betraying the trust of the people of Pennsylvania. 
 
Pursuant to the Senate Rules of Practice and Procedure 
for Impeachment Trials, the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate appointed a committee of six senators to conduct 
evidentiary hearings regarding the allegations contained in 
the Articles of Impeachment. On September 20, after a 
month of hearings before the committee, the full Senate 
heard oral argument on Larsen's pretrial motions in which 
he requested, inter alia, that his trial be held before the full 
Senate as opposed to a committee, that certain senators 
recuse themselves, and that he be allowed to take 
discovery. All of Larsen's motions were denied without 
debate. On September 27, the senate committee provided 
the full Senate and Larsen's counsel with a copy of its final 
report, containing a summary of the evidence presented at 
the hearings, and, at the same time, the full Senate heard 
closing arguments from both sides. On October 4, 1994, 
the Senate voted 44 to 5 to convict Larsen on Article II and 
to acquit him on the other six articles. The Senate then 
voted unanimously to bar Larsen from holding any office of 
trust or profit in Pennsylvania in the future. 
 
On June 13, 1994, the Court of Common Pleas sentenced 
Larsen on his criminal conviction to probation and 
community service, later suspended pending appeal. In 
addition, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution, the 
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trial judge removed Larsen from office as a Justice of the 
Supreme Court.1 
 
II. 
 
Procedural History 
 
Larsen instituted the present S 1983 action on September 
13, 1995. His 30-page amended complaint names the 
Pennsylvania Senate, the Supreme Court, the 
Administrative Office, the Judicial Conduct Board, the 
Court of Judicial Discipline and the individual members of 
each entity in their official and personal capacities. Only 
Part I of the amended complaint, containing Larsen's claims 
against the Senate and individual Senators, is relevant to 
this appeal. There, Larsen alleges in subpart (a) that he was 
denied rights secured by the Sixth Amendment and the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, listing approximately twenty 
examples of ways in which the procedures he was accorded 
allegedly fell below constitutional standards. In subpart (b), 
Larsen alleges that the statements contained in his petition 
for the disqualification and recusal of two of his fellow 
justices were substantial and motivating factors in his 
removal from office in violation of the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. Larsen seeks compensatory 
and punitive damages from the Senators in their personal 
capacities. In the Senators' official capacities, Larsen seeks 
"declaratory and injunctive relief, voiding the Senate 
impeachment verdict of guilty on Article II." App. at 97. 
 
In the district court, the Senators moved to dismiss Part 
I of the amended complaint on the grounds, among others, 
that Larsen's claims are not justiciable, that they are 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, that the Senators are entitled to absolute 
legislative immunity, and that the complaint failed to state 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed Larsen's conviction and 
remanded only for a recalculation of his term of probation. See 
Commonwealth v. Larsen, 682 A.2d 783 (Pa. Super. 1996), appeal 
denied, 692 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1996). 
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a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district 
court ruled that Larsen's claims against the Senate and the 
Senators were not "political questions" and were justiciable. 
With respect to the immunity issues, the court dismissed 
Larsen's claims against the Senate as barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment, but held that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not bar Larsen's claims for injunctive and 
declaratory relief against the individual Senators in their 
official capacities. In addition, the court dismissed Larsen's 
claims for damages against the Senators in their personal 
capacities, holding that the Senators were entitled to 
absolute legislative immunity from those claims. Turning to 
the merits, the court reasoned that Larsen had a"highly 
circumscribed" property interest in his position and that 
"for the most part, whatever procedural safeguards to 
which he was entitled pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment were met by the impeachment proceedings." 
Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pa. (Larsen I), 955 
F. Supp. 1549, 1570 (M.D. Pa. 1997). As a result, the court 
then dismissed the vast majority of Larsen's due process 
allegations for failure to state claims upon which relief 
could be granted. 
 
On the Senators' motion for reconsideration, the court 
refused to reconsider its holding that absolute legislative 
immunity did not preclude the claims seeking prospective 
injunctive relief in the Senators' official capacities. Larsen v. 
Senate of the Commonwealth of Pa. (Larsen II ), 965 F. Supp. 
607, 612 (M.D. Pa. 1977). The court did, however, agree to 
certify for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) its 
rulings on the issue whether Larsen possessed a 
constitutionally protected property interest in his position. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of this dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343. A 
motions panel of this court granted the Senators' motion to 
permit the interlocutory appeal with respect to the issue 
whether Larsen had a constitutionally protected property 
interest in the elected office of Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania and, if so, the extent of that interest. 
We therefore have appellate jurisdiction over that issue 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). 
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The Senators also appeal from the district court's partial 
denial of their claim to absolute legislative immunity. We 
regard the denial of the Senators' claim of absolute 
legislative immunity as analogous to the denial of a 
government official's right to claim either absolute or 
qualified immunity, which the Supreme Court held in 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), is immediately 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine first 
articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541 (1949). Therefore, we have appellate jurisdiction 
over that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of 
the district court's disposition of a motion to dismiss is 
plenary. See generally Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 
F.2d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
III. 
 
Justiciability 
 
The Senators press their contention that Larsen's claim is 
not justiciable despite the failure of the motions panel to 
accept that issue for certification under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(b). We agree that it is not only an issue that we can 
reach, but one that we must reach. The Supreme Court 
made clear this past term that a federal court cannot 
proceed to consider the merits of an action until it is 
satisfied that the dispute falls within the class of cases or 
controversies to which Article III, S 2 of the United States 
Constitution has extended the judicial power of the United 
States. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 
S. Ct. 1003 (1998), the Court disapproved the "doctrine of 
hypothetical jurisdiction" by which some courts"assumed" 
jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits. The 
Court in Steel Co. emphasized that a court that is without 
proper jurisdiction cannot proceed at all, and must merely 
note the jurisdictional defect and dismiss the suit. Id. at 
1012; see also McNasby v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 832 
F.2d 47, 49 (3d Cir. 1987) ("this court has a`special 
obligation' to satisfy itself of its own jurisdiction in every 
appeal presented to it") (quoting Bender v. Williamsport 
Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986)). 
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It may be that the motions panel did not certify the 
district court's denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of 
justiciability because it believed that issue alone did not 
qualify for interlocutory appeal under S 1292(b). But once it 
did grant the petition of the Senators and certified the 
issues whether Larsen had a property interest in the office 
of Justice and the extent of that interest, we became free to 
address any matter necessary to our decision of those 
issues. See Dailey v. Nat'l Hockey League, 987 F.2d 172, 
175 (3d Cir. 1993). A somewhat similar issue arose in Ivy 
Club v. Edwards, 943 F.2d 270, 275 (3d Cir. 1991), where 
we held that before reaching the merits of the issue raised 
by the S 1292(b) certification, we were obliged to determine 
whether that issue was moot, notwithstanding the fact that 
the mootness question was not one of the issues certified 
for appeal. See id. at 275-76. In like manner, we have an 
obligation to determine whether the instant controversy is 
justiciable prior to our reaching the merits of the issues 
certified for appeal. 
 
Once we turn to the issue of justiciability, wefind that 
the basis of the Senators' objection trenches upon, but does 
not follow, traditional justiciability analysis. The Senators 
concede that "[t]he issue of justiciability presented here is 
not so much a `political question' as it is one of federalism 
and of a proper respect for state functions." Appellants' Br. 
at 24. That is an apt characterization. In its seminal 
opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme 
Court noted that "[t]he nonjusticiability of a political 
question is primarily a function of the separation of 
powers." Id. at 210. It continued, "it is the relationship 
between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the 
Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's 
relationship to the States, which gives rise to the`political 
question.' " Id. Thus, because the issues raised by Larsen 
call upon us to review the actions of a state legislature as 
opposed to the acts of one of the political branches of the 
federal government, the case does not present a typical 
"political question" as that term has come to be defined. 
Nevertheless, the Senators rely on the political question 
cases and argue that their reasoning applies with equal 
force here. 
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The Senators first rely on the Supreme Court's decision 
in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), holding 
nonjusticiable a federal judge's challenge to his 
impeachment. Walter Nixon, a former United States district 
judge, filed suit contending that his impeachment trial 
before a committee of the United States Senate, as opposed 
to the full Senate, violated the command of Article I of the 
United States Constitution that "[t]he Senate shall have the 
sole Power to try all Impeachments," U.S. Const. art. I, S 3, 
cl. 6. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226. The Court reasoned that 
the word "try" lacked judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards and that the word "sole" constituted 
a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" to 
the Senate. Id. at 229-36. It stated that"[a] controversy is 
nonjusticiable--i.e., involves a political question--where 
there is `a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it.' " Id. at 228 (quoting 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). Accordingly, it held that Nixon's 
claim was nonjusticiable. Id. at 237-38. 
 
The Senators argue that, as in Nixon, there is a lack of 
judicially manageable standards rendering this case 
nonjusticiable. We do not agree that Nixon controls our 
analysis, and note that the Supreme Court has cautioned 
that "[m]uch confusion results from the capacity of the 
`political question' label to obscure the need for case-by- 
case inquiry." Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11. Larsen's claims 
do not implicate Article I, S 3, cl. 6 of the United States 
Constitution and thus the language of the phrase assigning 
to the Senate trial of all impeachments is not the issue in 
this suit. Larsen's challenge to his impeachment is based 
primarily on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Freedom of Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment. Both areas of the law are firmly within the 
domain of the federal judiciary and both are the subject of 
judicially developed legal principles that guide our 
decisions. Unlike the political question cases, where the 
"court[s] acknowledge[ ] the possibility that a constitutional 
provision may not be judicially enforceable," United States 
Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992), 
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issues involving the First and Fourteenth Amendments are 
regularly enforced by judicial decision. 
 
The Senators turn again to Nixon as support for their 
argument that concerns for finality and the logistical 
difficulties that would be presented in the event of an order 
for Larsen's reinstatement counsel against federal court 
review of his impeachment proceedings. In Nixon , the Court 
stated that "we are persuaded that the lack offinality and 
the difficulty of fashioning relief counsel against 
justiciability." Id. at 236 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 210). In 
its discussion, the Court noted the uncertainty of"the 
question of what relief a court may give other than simply 
setting aside the judgment of conviction. Could it order the 
reinstatement of a convicted federal judge, or order 
Congress to create an additional judgeship if the seat had 
been filled in the interim?" Id. 
 
We do not discount the similar difficulties that would be 
presented in fashioning a remedy for an impeached state 
judge. However, the Nixon case does not provide a basis for 
finding nonjusticiability on that ground. In Nixon, the Court 
explicitly relied on the finality argument only"[i]n addition 
to the textual commitment argument." Id. at 236. There is 
no indication in Nixon or any other case cited by the 
Senators that, absent a textual commitment to a coordinate 
branch of the federal government, concerns for finality and 
the difficulty in formulating appropriate relief alone would 
suffice to render a case nonjusticiable. 
 
The only injunctive relief explicitly sought in the portion 
of Larsen's amended complaint directed to the Senators is 
that the court vacate and declare void the conviction of 
impeachment, relief that could be granted without ordering 
his reinstatement to the bench. We do note that although 
Larsen's amended complaint does not include a prayer for 
reinstatement, the district court understood he was seeking 
that relief, see 955 F. Supp. at 1557, and Larsen so 
indicated in this court. Nonetheless, while the difficulty of 
ordering such relief is relevant in our analysis of a different 
issue, for the reasons set forth above it is not alone a basis 
to find the claim nonjusticiable. 
 
Finally, the Senators make the broad argument that 
" `Our Federalism' counsels strongly against federal courts 
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interfering in state impeachment proceedings which are not 
reviewable in state courts and which would not be 
justiciable if they were federal proceedings." Appellants' Br. 
at 22. They argue that the Pennsylvania Constitution is 
virtually identical in relevant respect to the United States 
Constitution and that we must honor its "textually 
demonstrable commitment" of the responsibility for 
conducting impeachment trials to the Pennsylvania Senate. 
However, we are aware of no cases in which the 
justiciability of a particular claim has turned on a textually 
demonstrable commitment appearing in any text other than 
the United States Constitution. A federal court derives its 
authority to hear a particular case or controversy from the 
United States Constitution and the various acts of 
Congress, and no provision removes cases of this kind from 
federal court jurisdiction. 
 
The Senators cite as "instructive" the decision in Davids 
v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1977), but the court in 
that case did not abjure jurisdiction. There, Democratic 
members of the Arizona House of Representatives brought 
a S 1983 action alleging that they had been denied equal 
protection and certain First Amendment rights when the 
Republican Speaker of the House assigned proportionally 
more Republicans to the standing committees than their 
ratio to the number of House Democrats. Although the 
court characterized the idea of a federal court meddling in 
the internal affairs of a state legislature as "startlingly 
unattractive," id. at 123, it rejected the defendants' 
justiciability argument on the ground that there was no 
separation of powers concern. Id. at 126. Once it reached 
the merits, it approved the entry of summary judgment for 
the defendants on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to 
state a constitutional claim upon which relief could be 
granted, id. at 123-25, but that, of course, is a disposition 
different than one based on lack of justiciability. 
 
This court has previously rejected challenges to its ability 
to hear claims raised against state legislators comparable to 
the challenges raised here. In Parker v. Merlino , 646 F.2d 
848 (3d Cir. 1981), a group of New Jersey state senators 
brought a S 1983 action against certain other senators 
alleging that their First Amendment rights had been 
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infringed when they were not permitted to participate in 
debate on particular tax bills. Like the Senators do here, 
the defendants in Parker argued that maintenance of the 
suit in federal court constituted an attack on the 
sovereignty of the State of New Jersey and its legislative 
branch. We rejected that argument on the ground that our 
jurisdiction derived from SS 1983, 1331 and 1343, and we 
proceeded to reach the merits of the case, which we decided 
against the plaintiff Senators. See id. at 852 (citing Bond v. 
Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 131 (1966) (holding that the Court 
had jurisdiction to review whether Georgia House of 
Representatives deprived one of its members of his 
constitutional rights when it refused to seat him on account 
of statements he had made criticizing the conduct of the 
war in Vietnam); see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 229 (citing 
Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1875) 
(where federal courts reviewed merits of claim that state 
public official's removal from office failed to comport with 
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee) and 
Foster v. State ex rel. Johnson, 112 U.S. 201 (1884) (same)); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) ("When a 
State exercises power wholly within the domain of state 
interest, it is insulated from judicial review. But such 
insulation is not carried over when state power is used as 
an instrument for circumventing a federally protected 
right."). 
 
As in Parker, we reject the Senators' argument that 
respect for the sovereigny of the state requires us to decline 
to exercise our jurisdiction. While the Senators may deem 
it inappropriate to find themselves as defendants in a 
federal court, the overriding fact is that the Fourteenth 
Amendment and S 1983 were intended to radically alter the 
distribution of power between the federal government and 
the states. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 
(1979) ("There is no question that both the supporters and 
opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 believed that the 
Act ceded to the Federal Government many important 
powers that previously had been considered to be within 
the exclusive province of the individual States."). To the 
extent that S 1983 may be seen as infringing on state 
sovereignty, Congress, in adopting S 1983 over a century 
ago, made the determination that such infringement was 
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not only tolerable but necessary to ensure the vindication 
of federal rights within the states. 
 
Accordingly, although fully cognizant of the respect due 
members of a state legislature when they act within the 
sphere of legitimate state interests, we reject the Senators' 
arguments that Larsen's claims against them are not 
justiciable. Many of the concerns they raise can be more 
appropriately addressed in the context of the immunity 
doctrines rather than by pretermitting the exercise of our 
jurisdiction through finding a lack of justiciability. 
 
IV. 
 
Legislative Immunity 
 
We turn directly to the immunity issue. In response to 
Larsen's complaint, the individual Senators filed motions to 
dismiss on a number of grounds, one of which was 
legislative immunity. The district court held that the 
individual Senators were entitled to absolute legislative 
immunity from claims asserted against them in their 
personal capacities--claims seeking only monetary relief. 
See Larsen I, 955 F. Supp. at 1563. However, the district 
court did not extend the Senators' legislative immunity to 
Larsen's claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory 
relief asserted against the Senators in their official 
capacities. See Larsen II, 965 F. Supp. at 608. 
 
The Senators devote much of their appeal to their 
contention that the district court erred in limiting the scope 
of their immunity to Larsen's claims for damages. Larsen, 
on the other hand, does not argue explicitly in his brief that 
the district court was correct in limiting the scope of the 
Senators' legislative immunity to his claims for monetary 
relief. Rather, he argues that when the Senators were 
engaged in the impeachment proceedings, they were 
performing a judicial, not a legislative, function and, 
therefore, are entitled only to judicial, as distinguished from 
legislative, immunity. It is settled that absolute judicial 
immunity extends only to claims for damages; therefore, if 
Larsen is correct that only judicial immunity were 
applicable, the Senators would not be entitled to dismissal 
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of the claim for injunctive or declaratory relief. See Pulliam 
v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540-42 (1984). 
 
On its face, S 1983 "admits of no immunities." Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). Nevertheless, courts 
"have recognized that Congress intended the statute to be 
construed in the light of common-law principles that were 
well settled at the time of its enactment." Kalina v. Fletcher, 
118 S. Ct. 502, 506 (1997). Thus, the Court has stated that 
a grant of immunity from suit under S 1983 must be 
"predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity 
historically accorded the relevant official at common law 
and the interests behind it." Owen v. City of Independence, 
445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421). 
"If parties seeking immunity were shielded from tort liability 
when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871--S 1 of 
which is codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1983--we infer from 
legislative silence that Congress did not intend to abrogate 
such immunities when it imposed liability for action taken 
under color of state law." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 
(1992). 
 
The legislative immunity accorded United States Senators 
and members of the House of Representatives is derived 
from the Speech or Debate Clause of Article I, S 6, Clause 
1 of the United States Constitution. It has long been settled 
that state legislators are also entitled to absolute legislative 
immunity from suit under S 1983 for legitimate legislative 
activities taken in their legislative capacities. See Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-76 (1951); see also Bogan v. 
Scott-Harris, 118 S. Ct. 966, 970 (1998). Though this 
immunity is a creature of federal common law, it is derived 
from the protection accorded the federal legislators. See 
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373-74. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that in civil cases, the scope of the common 
law legislative immunity accorded state legislators is 
coterminous with that of the immunity provided by the 
Speech or Debate Clause. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. 
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 
732-33 (1980). 
 
Recognition of state legislators' entitlement to legislative 
immunity in S 1983 actions does not end the inquiry 
because the immunity extends only to acts taken in their 
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legislative capacities. We must still determine whether the 
Senators performing their role in impeachment proceedings 
were acting in their legislative or, as Larsen argues, in their 
judicial capacities. The Supreme Court has adopted a 
functional approach to immunity issues so that "[w]hether 
an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act," Bogan, 
118 S. Ct. at 973, rather than the nature of the actor's 
office or his or her intent. See, e.g., Consumers Union, 446 
U.S. at 731 (affording legislative immunity to justices of 
state supreme court when acting in their rulemaking 
capacity). Therefore, to determine whether a particular 
immunity is appropriate, we must look to the interests 
behind it, see Owen, 445 U.S. at 638, remaining mindful 
that "it is the interest in protecting the proper functioning 
of the office, rather than the interest in protecting its 
occupant, that is of primary importance." Kalina, 118 S. Ct. 
at 507. 
 
The Supreme Court had occasion to examine the extent 
of legislative immunity when an organization that was the 
subject of an investigation by a Senate Subcommittee 
sought to enjoin enforcement of the Subcommittee's 
subpoena directed to third parties. Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). The 
Supreme Court framed the question to be resolved as 
"[w]hether the actions of the [Senators] fall within the 
`sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' " Id. at 501. The 
Court began its analysis with a discussion of the purpose 
of legislative immunity, which it explained is "to protect the 
integrity of the legislative process by insuring the 
independence of individual legislators." Id.  at 502 
(quotation omitted). It "prevent[s] intimidation of legislators 
by the Executive and accountability before a possibly 
hostile judiciary." Id. (quotation omitted). As such, it 
reinforces the separation of powers that is fundamental to 
the structure of both the federal and state governments. 
See id.; Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372-75. It stated that 
legislative independence is imperiled whenever the power of 
the judiciary is brought to bear on the legislature. See 
Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503. 
 
An additional purpose of legislative immunity is to shield 
the legislature from the delay and disruption that a lawsuit 
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can bring. "[A] private civil action, whether for an injunction 
or damages, creates a distraction and forces [legislators] to 
divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative 
tasks to defend the litigation." Id. 
 
Consistent with these purposes, the Court has held that 
"[a]bsolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions 
taken `in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' " 
Bogan, 118 S. Ct. at 972 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376). 
To determine whether a particular task is in the sphere of 
legitimate legislative activity, "we look to see whether the 
activities took place in a session of the House by one of its 
members in relation to the business before it." Eastland, 
421 U.S. at 503. More specifically, the inquiry is whether 
the activities are 
 
       `an integral part of the deliberative and communicative 
       process by which Members participate in committee 
       and House proceedings with respect to the 
       consideration and passage or rejection of proposed 
       legislation or with respect to other matters which the 
       Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either 
       House.' 
 
Id. at 504 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 US. 606, 
625 (1972) (emphasis added)). Most recently, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed that legislative immunity attaches to 
actions taken " `in a field where legislators traditionally have 
power to act.' " Bogan, 118 S. Ct. at 973 (quoting Tenney, 
341 U.S. at 379 (applying principle to state legislators)). 
 
Applying that criteria to legislative action in impeachment 
and conviction of a federal judge, the Supreme Court noted 
that the Constitution places impeachment within the sole 
jurisdiction of Congress. See Nixon v. United States, 506 
U.S. 224, 229 (1993). Impeachments take place in session 
and are the official business before the legislature. It thus 
unhesitatingly concluded that this is an area where 
legislatures traditionally have the power to act. 
 
In Nixon, the Court, after reviewing the history of the 
impeachment clause, stated: "Judicial involvement in 
impeachment proceedings, even if only for purposes of 
judicial review, is counterintuitive because it would 
eviscerate the `important constitutional check' placed on 
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the Judiciary by the Framers." Id. at 235. In The Federalist 
No. 65, Alexander Hamilton advocated to the people of the 
State of New York the wisdom in placing the power to try 
impeachments in the Senate. The Federalist No. 65 
(Alexander Hamilton). Though he referred to "the judicial 
character of the Senate" when sitting for that purpose, he 
emphasized that impeachments "are of a nature which may 
with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL." Id. at 
439 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis in original). He 
conceived of the power of impeachment as "a bridle in the 
hands of the legislative body" id. at 441, and offered two 
compelling reasons why the courts, particularly the 
Supreme Court, were an inappropriate repository for the 
awesome power of impeachment. First, he argued: 
 
       The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of 
       impeachments is equally dictated by the nature of the 
       proceeding. This can never be tied down by such strict 
       rules, either in the delineation of the offence by the 
       prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the Judges, 
       . . . who are to pronounce the sentence of the law and 
       the party who is to receive or suffer it. The awful 
       discretion, which a court of impeachments must 
       necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the 
       most confidential and the most distinguished 
       characters of the community, forbids the commitment 
       of the trust to a small number of persons. 
 
Id. at 441-42. 
 
Hamilton then strengthened his argument with the 
following reasoning: 
 
       The punishment, which may be the consequence of 
       conviction upon impeachment, is not to terminate the 
       chastisement of the offender. After having been 
       sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem 
       and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his 
       country; he will still be liable to prosecution and 
       punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be 
       proper that the persons, who had disposed of his fame 
       and his most valuable rights as a citizen in one trial, 
       . . . for the same offence, be also the disposers of his 
       life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest 
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       reason to apprehend, that error in the first sentence 
       would be the parent of error in the second sentence? 
       That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to 
       overrule the influence of any new lights, which might 
       be brought to vary the complexion of another decision? 
       Those, who know any thing of human nature, will not 
       hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative; 
       and will be at no loss to perceive, that by making the 
       same persons Judges in both cases, those who might 
       happen to be the objects of prosecution would in a 
       great measure be deprived of the double security, 
       intended them by a double trial. 
 
Id. at 442. 
 
These arguments confirm that the placement in the 
Senate of the power to try impeachments was not by 
accident or chance. See id. at 440 (describing the Senate as 
"the most fit depositary of this important trust"). Rather, 
the power was consciously assigned to the Senate primarily 
as a function of the separation of powers. As such, allowing 
the courts to review the Senate's judgment following trial on 
impeachment would negate the careful balancing designed 
by the framers and approved by the ratifiers. Of course, 
when the impeachment has been of a judge, the need is 
most imperative for legislative independence from judicial 
review and for protection from "accountability before a 
possibly hostile judiciary." Eastland, 421 U.S. at 502. 
 
Although a legislature that sits in impeachment 
proceedings is not debating, drafting or voting on 
legislation, "the sphere of legitimate legislative activity," 
Bogan, 118 S. Ct. at 972, for purposes of legislative 
immunity, is not so limited. See, e.g., Tenney, 341 U.S. at 
379 (state legislators accorded legislative immunity in suit 
alleging that legislators sought to intimidate and or silence 
a witness by holding hearing and by encouraging 
prosecution of witness); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486, 506 (1969) (members of Congress accorded legislative 
immunity in suit challenging refusal by House to seat an 
elected member); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 203- 
04 (1880) (legislative immunity protected legislators from 
suit challenging issuance of contempt order and arrest 
warrant for failure to testify). 
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Given that impeachments are matters " `which the 
Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either 
House,' " Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504 (quoting Gravel v. 
United States, 408 US. 606, 625 (1972)), and represent " `a 
field where legislators traditionally have power to act,' " 
Bogan, 118 S. Ct. at 973 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379), 
we are convinced that when legislators play the role they 
have been given in impeachment proceedings, they act 
within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and within 
their legislative capacities. Thus, the necessity for 
independence requires that legislators be accorded 
legislative immunity and "not be questioned in any other 
place," U.S. Const. art. I, S 7, cl. 1, concerning their activity 
and their decision. 
 
Larsen, to support his argument that impeachment is not 
legislative in nature, relies on the standards we developed 
for determining whether certain acts performed at the local 
level are legislative or administrative. See, e.g., Carver v. 
Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing cases). In 
making that decision, we ask whether the act is 
"substantively legislative" as involving policy-making or line 
drawing and whether it is "procedurally legislative" as being 
"passed by means of established legislative procedures." Id. 
The line-drawing between administrative and legislative 
acts at issue in these cases has no bearing under the 
situation before us because neither party suggests that the 
Senators were acting in an administrative capacity. 
Moreover, because concerns for the separation of powers 
are often at a minimum at the municipal level, we decline 
to extend our analysis developed for municipalities to other 
levels of government. 
 
For the same reason, we are not persuaded that Brown 
v. Griesenauer, 970 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1992), compels a 
different result. There, the court held that the members of 
a local board of aldermen that impeached the mayor were 
entitled only to judicial rather than legislative immunity 
because it characterized impeachment as essentially a 
judicial act "that happens to have been done by legislators." 
Id. at 437. As the preceding discussion makes clear, 
impeachment is not something that just happened  to be 
assigned to the legislative branch, at least at the state and 
federal levels. 
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We conclude, therefore, that the Senators were acting in 
their legislative capacities while engaged in Larsen's 
impeachment proceedings, and, accordingly, that they were 
entitled to legislative immunity from claims for damages in 
their individual capacities. This was the conclusion also 
reached by the district court in its thoughtful principal 
opinion. See Larsen I, 955 F. Supp. at 1563. In the 
discussion of the Eleventh Amendment, the court noted 
that Larsen had also requested declaratory and injunctive 
relief against the Senators in their official capacities, 
specifically the voiding of the Senate impeachment verdict 
of guilty. The court held that Larsen's claims against the 
Senate and other state entities, such as the Supreme 
Court, were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but that 
Larsen's request to void the impeachment was one for 
prospective reinstatement that was not precluded. See id. 
at 1562. 
 
The district court did not explicitly consider the 
applicability of legislative immunity to Larsen's request for 
prospective relief, see id., and it is unclear whether the 
Senators had invoked that doctrine as to the claims 
asserted against them in their official capacities. The 
Senators sought reconsideration on that issue, asking the 
court to reconsider its holding that absolute legislative 
immunity does not preclude Larsen's claims against them 
in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief. 
Without any discussion, the court declined to reconsider its 
prior holding because it believed that its decision was in 
accordance with prior Third Circuit discussions of this 
issue, citing Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(en banc). See Larsen II, 965 F. Supp. at 608-09. 
 
We are aware that language in that opinion may have led 
to some confusion on this issue. In Acierno, where we 
considered the availability of legislative immunity to various 
activities of members of the county council, there is dicta 
with respect to the scope of legislative immunity that is 
misleading and, regrettably, incorrect. We stated, inter alia, 
that "the Supreme Court has never held that legislative 
immunity applies to both claims for damages and injunctive 
relief " citing Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731-34, and 
stated further that this court and others have held"that 
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absolute immunity is a bar to damages only, and not to 
prospective or injunctive relief," Schrob v. Catterson (Schrob 
II), 967 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1992). See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 607 
n.8. 
 
Reexamination of the cited cases discloses that in fact the 
Supreme Court in Consumers Union did resolve the issue of 
the application of absolute legislative immunity to claims 
for prospective relief and answered that question in the 
affirmative. The Consumers Union case presented the 
Supreme Court with a challenge to attorneys' fees imposed 
on the Virginia Supreme Court and its Chief Justice by a 
district court following its holding that the state Bar Code's 
prohibition of lawyer advertising was unconstitutional. As 
we noted supra, the Supreme Court held that in 
promulgating disciplinary rules the Virginia Supreme Court 
"acted in a legislative capacity." Id. at 731. In the 
discussion of the consequence in terms of legislative 
immunity, the Court referenced its earlier decision in 
Tenney. Its discussion left no doubt of the scope of 
legislative immunity. It said, "Although Tenney involved an 
action for damages under S 1983, its holding is equally 
applicable to S 1983 actions seeking declaratory or 
injunctive relief. In holding that S 1983`does not create civil 
liability' for acts . . . `in a field where legislators traditionally 
have power to act,' we did not distinguish between actions 
for damages and those for prospective relief." Id. at 732-33 
(citation omitted). The Court therefore held both declaratory 
relief and attorneys' fees were unavailable. 
 
The issue the Court left unresolved in Consumers Union 
did not concern legislative immunity but whether judicial 
immunity would bar prospective relief. See Consumers 
Union, 446 U.S. at 735 ("we have never held that judicial 
immunity absolutely insulates judges from declaratory or 
injunctive relief with respect to their judicial acts"). 
Similarly, the issue in Schrob II did not relate to absolute 
legislative immunity, but instead was the applicability of 
absolute prosecutorial immunity from common law tort 
claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Schrob II, 
967 F.2d at 939. 
 
The various immunities, legislative, judicial, prosecutorial 
and official, have different purposes and characteristics. 
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Unfortunately, the dicta in Acierno did not accurately 
distinguish between them, as the cases relied upon for the 
proposition asserted concerned immunities other than  
legislative.2 We are not obliged to perpetuate that error out 
of blind adherence to a position articulated in a case where 
the issue was not squarely before us. " `Wisdom too often 
never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely 
because it comes late.' " Spencer v. Kemna , 118 S. Ct. 978, 
990 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Henslee v. 
Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
 
It is likely that our error led the district court astray on 
that issue in this case. In fact, as noted above, the 
Supreme Court has unambiguously held that the legislative 
immunity enjoyed by state, as well as federal, officials is 
"applicable to S 1983 actions seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief." Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 732; see 
also Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 278 (1990); 
Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501-03 (applying legislative immunity 
to United States Senators in action seeking only declaratory 
and injunctive relief). These cases show that, at least in 
appropriate cases, legislators are entitled to immunity from 
claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief. 3 
 
Legislative immunity must be applied pragmatically, and 
not by labels. Thus, without attempting to draw a line for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In two of the three cases that involved legislative immunity, the 
courts 
agreed that "[l]egislators' immunity is absolute and extends to injunctive 
as well as damage suits." Resser v. Thompson , 930 F.2d 549, 551 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (citing Tenney, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)). Accord Alia v. Michigan 
Supreme Court, 906 F.2d 1100, 1102 (6th Cir. 1990). In the third case, 
Executive 100 Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1539-40 (11th Cir. 
1991), the discussion was dictum as no prospective relief was sought 
against the local legislators. 
 
3. Larsen is mistaken in his citation of Parker v. Merlino, 646 F.2d 848 
(3d Cir. 1981), as illustrating that legislative immunity is inapplicable 
to 
suits for prospective injunctive relief. Parker , discussed supra, 
involved 
a complaint by some New Jersey state Senators against others that they 
had not been given the opportunity to debate the merits of tax bills. We 
explicitly noted that the appellants did not raise on appeal the district 
court's holding that the state legislators were immune only against 
liability for money damages. See id. at 852 n.11. 
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all cases, we examine whether Larsen's request for 
prospective relief from the Senators could be accorded 
consistent with the policies underlying legislative immunity. 
The extent to which a court could order relief must be 
considered in that context. This is not a case where the 
court, should Larsen be successful, need merely direct the 
seating of a properly elected legislator, see Bond v. Floyd, 
385 U.S. 116 (1966), nor a case where the legislative body 
had previously agreed to a consent decree to build racially 
desegregated housing, see Spallone, 493 U.S. at 270-73. 
Larsen seeks reinstatement - nothing less than that the 
individual Senators rescind their guilty vote on his 
impeachment. It is difficult to imagine a remedy that would 
more directly interfere with the role assigned exclusively to 
the Senators by the Pennsylvania Constitution. 
 
Larsen's challenges to the impeachment proceedings 
include the Senate's use of a committee to hear evidence, 
the absence of some committee members during 
presentation of evidence, the inadequacy of thefinal report, 
the format of the report, the inadequacy of the evidence, the 
factors considered by the Senators in casting their votes, 
and the alleged consideration by Senators of material 
outside the record. Larsen candidly states that he"is 
entitled to discovery on the activities and participation of 
each senator in the proceedings and decisions." Appellees' 
Br. at 48. 
 
The extensive discovery Larsen seeks into the motives for 
the Senators' votes, discussion among them, material each 
considered and the myriad other matters that enter into 
any legislator's vote would entail the paradigmatic 
impermissible questioning of the Senators in another place 
about their disposition of a matter we have already held lies 
within the sphere of their legislative activities. See Tenney, 
341 U.S. at 377 ("The privilege would be of little value if 
[legislators] could be subjected to . . . the hazard of a 
judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as 
to motives."). This would also cause the other injury that 
underlies the need for legislative immunity by diverting 
their time and attention away from legislative duties. Merely 
to state the effect is to recognize why legislative immunity 
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must cover the prospective injunctive relief Larsen seeks 
against the Senators.4 
 
V. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Senators were entitled 
to the protections of legislative immunity from suit for 
Larsen's claims for prospective injunctive relief. Because 
the immunity issue disposes of the entirety of Larsen's 
allegations against the Senators, we need not address the 
issue of whether Larsen possessed a constitutionally 
protected property interest in his elected position. We will 
remand the matter to the district court with instructions to 
dismiss all of Larsen's claims against the Senators. 
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4. As the prospective relief sought is of necessity against the Senators 
in 
their official capacities, we do not discourse on the differences between 
immunity in their individual as distinguished from official capacities. 
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